Life Tips

1、吃芋头相当于注射免疫球蛋白，增强人体的免疫功能。
2、枸杞子： 嚼服枸杞口中津液长生，抗动脉硬化、降低血糖、促进肝细胞新生等作用，服之有增强体质、延缓衰老之功效。
3、揉眼：自寻手部柔软的部位，揉按眼睛、眼眶四周，促进眼周血液循环，可明目、醒脑，还兼具美容作用。
4、常喝酸奶：酸奶的营养价值极高 。
5、绿茶——抗癌，并可补充钾元素，增加血管的柔韧度。

6、要多吃五谷杂粮——玉米、荞麦、燕麦、小米（有安神促进睡眠的作用！）
7、土豆——恐怕你我都想不到，它竟然有吸脂的作用！　
8、西红柿——抗癌，不过要和鸡蛋炒才能生成抗癌物质哦！
9、黑木耳——治肺炎，治心脑血管病，调节血液粘稠度！能净化血液，轻身强记，脑动脉粥样斑块。
10、长了痘痘，发红发肿，这时您抹上点艾灰，会很快干瘪，慢慢就掉了，不会留痘印哦。

11、艾灰是天然的除味剂，用小布袋子装起来，放在厕所、厨房或者是冰箱里，能起到除异味的效果，可以跟竹炭相媲美。
12、体湿的人可以用薏米红豆汤或锅巴来解决。喝上一阵子薏米红豆汤之后，再喝小米粥来补补脾胃，久之脾健，湿自化。
13、给女人带来福气的大穴。它位于外踝前侧约一寸的地方，肌肉微凸，极易辨认，可以用压痛法取准，也就是哪里最敏感、最痛就压哪里，每次按8分钟，酸胀感越强烈越有效。
14、指甲半月板过大，面积超过2/3，说明患高血压的几率大。.指甲有黑斑，说明血脂高。
15、再没有比“鸡内金”更金贵的补品了， 鸡内金是调治积食的特效药。 鸡是杂食动物，它吃谷物、草籽，也吃虫子。而鸡是没有牙齿的，吃什么都是囫囵吞枣，全靠胃来消化，可见鸡的消化功能很强大。所以，吃鸡的补益作用主要就是补脾胃。

16、每天一把坚果，降糖又调脂。
17、黑木耳加白木耳，滋补肺阴肾阴。
18、多吃洋葱预防骨质疏松。
19、骨质疏松可适量吃坚果。
20、饭后吃个梨，排除毒素，助你更健康。

21、大枣 山药补脾胃。
22、番茄红素能防肿瘤。
23、小孩九个月以后用学步车。
24、高血压喝橘子汁。
25、桂圆枸杞茶可治疗乾眼症  

26、牛蒡榨汁清肠 .
27、每天补充10mg叶酸有效预防冠心病。
28、桂圆晨吃补脾 晚吃安神。
29、治水肿：西瓜皮、冬瓜皮、赤小豆各30克，水煎服。
30、催乳：猪蹄2个，通草6克，炖汤服。 

31、治老年人耳聋：狗肉250克，马豆60克，同炖烂，早晚分2次食完，连食数周即愈。
32、明目：霜桑叶、菊花各6克。共研细末，炼蜜为丸如绿豆大，每服6克，白开水送服。
33、“艾姜煮蛋”，扫净女性体内恶寒。
34、梅核气穴---------慢性咽炎一次即愈 。梅核气穴是中医经验穴,临床专治梅核气的梅核气穴，手掌劳宫穴稍下，掌面食指中指缝后一寸。主舒肝理气、利咽、镇静安神，为梅核气经验穴，多数患者针后一次即愈，取穴宜男左女。
35、后溪穴让肝血充足眼睛亮。

36、钙补不进是脾肾的功能下降，平时要注意调理脾肾。
37、改善50岁女人的失眠——牛黄清心丸、加味逍遥丸、枣仁安神丸。
38、改善50岁女人的缺钙——金匮肾气丸、六味地黄丸、健脾丸。
39、延缓更年期的关键在于补肾，补脾。
40、女人生孩子是一个伤肾的过程。女性最佳的生育年龄25-30岁。

41、心动过速（心跳过快）往往是心气虚的前兆，应注意休息，调整心态，伴气短、乏力的可泡服西洋参片、人参片或生脉饮口服液，不缓解者及时就医。
42、心动过缓（心跳过慢）多是心肌炎后遗症，如伴乏力、气短胸闷，要停止剧烈运动，泡服人参片及服丹参片，如不缓解者应就医。
43、心气虚的表现为心慌、气短、乏力、脉快或慢。如伴心阳虚则手足冷、畏寒、面色白。心气虚者可用：人参、黄芪、肉桂。
44、心阴虚的表现：心慌、心烦、头晕耳鸣、舌质红、脉细数。心阴虚者可用：桂圆肉、大枣、莲子、麦冬。
45、肺气虚的主要表现有气短、咳嗽、痰清、乏力、自汗、脉弱，舌质淡白。肺气虚者可服冬虫夏草、黄芪、沙参。

46、肺阴虚的主要表现为气短、咳嗽、痰稠、咽干、舌质红、脉数。肺阴虚可多吃百合、山药、杏仁。
47、脾阴虚的主要表现有口干、作呕、食少、便干、舌质红、脉细数。
　　药食同补：可用麦冬、山药、粳米。如感觉自己消化不良、腹胀、不思食等，饭前或饭后可服用山楂、炒谷麦芽、炒鸡内金。
48、肝气虚：第一表现是疲劳，其次是头晕，两胁不适，脉无力。用柴胡、薄荷、苏叶可舒肝郁，防气结，肝气虚重的可用人参、黄芪。
49、肝阴虚：主要表现为头晕目花，四肢麻木，筋络不疏，因为肝气虚失于营养之故，还有烦躁易怒、脉细。可用当归、动物肝脏、枸杞、阿胶。
50、肾阴虚的表现有：头晕耳鸣、腰酸腿软、咽干、舌质红、脉细数。药食同补用枸杞、熟地、桑椹。肾虚不纳气的人多伴有肾阳虚的症状，所以温肾阳很重要，可服用金匮肾气丸。

51、口臭 ：服用清胃黄连丸；常吃苦瓜炒西红柿。
52、口苦：服用龙胆泻肝丸。 

日本如何输掉新互联网时代

当年日本人意气风发买下帝国大厦、梵高画的时候，雅达利泡沫猝然袭来整个美国都在日本资本四处出击而感到惴惴不安的时候，恐怕没有多少人会想到不过二三十年的工夫，这个曾经看起来不可一世的巨人就轰然倒塌。

　　失去的20年已然无法寻回，但是更令世界震惊与迷惑的是，曾经号称“技术的索尼”、建构引领业界工业设计美学观的索尼究竟为何会沦落到今天这个地步，在两个季度之前，索尼才取得自2008年以来的首次盈利，所谓的One Sony 蓝图直到现在还没有一个整体而清晰的构架，如果不是有 PS 主机，如果不是有 Xperia 系列智能手机，除了乔布斯视索尼为偶像这种言之凿凿的传闻之外，这些年的索尼能让人记住的地方究竟还有什么呢？

　　索尼的衰败更像是冰山一角，映射的不仅是日本经济的衰滞，更是整个日本科技圈江河日下的残局。

　　东芝、松下被三星揍得满地滚爬，京瓷、夏普在国内市场的风头在苹果到来之后就被抢得一干二净，矢志要做日本 IBM 的富士通如今在国际市场上早已经近乎销声匿迹，任天堂，我们是在说那个如今满口游戏性再无其他说辞的东西吗？真得当 Vavle、Rockstar、顽皮狗 不存在吗？

　　这些曾经金光闪闪的品牌死在闭关锁国上，如果不是有 iPhone 这种奇葩产品，或许到今天日本的消费者还以为他们的功能手机和 DOCOMO 的网络搭配是最好，或许直到今天他们还是喜欢互相留对方的电子邮箱地址是理所当然的；它们死在自以为是上，即使鼎盛强大如索尼者，在当年实际上也没有在拓展海外市场上花特别的心思，脱亚入欧的口号喊了百年，但是岛国的小农经济理念依旧深入人心，仅仅满足于国内市场，最终的结果就是面对互联网和全球化带来的空前绝后的开放，最终只有俯首就擒的下场。

　　思维一封闭，观念一保守，手段再高强也是白搭。

　　日本科技企业最大的软肋莫过于对互联网思潮的漠视和无动于衷，直至今日，我们都很难看到他们在这方面有任何有企图有效果的动作，即使面临苹果、Google、Twitter 的冲击才想起去搭建自己的互联网生态体系，可惜即使如索尼在这个互联网时代，晚了一步就再也赶不上了——P&Z 和各种课金手游现在还是最火的，日本人的小家子气喷薄欲出，真是挡都挡不住。

　　iPhone 和 App Store 的成功宣告了移动智能时代的来临，Android 的风行也清楚地告诉大家“软件”、“平台”和“硬件”究竟如何去结合。很明显，日本过去那套闭门造车精益求精的匠人精神只适合在前互联网时代做产品，但是抱着这种心态和眼光在这个新的时代注定要四处碰壁。

　　“匠人”身上有传承，有源流，有情怀，一丝不苟苦心孤诣，有“道”，有“器”，有“术”。他们可以做出一二三四五……甚至每个产品都可能是臻至艺术品的精品，他们可以不断完善改进推出更优秀的次代产品，然后赢得市场的交口称赞，最后轻而易举地取得近乎垄断性的优势。

　　但是然后呢？我们听 Walkman，玩游戏机，为“鱼雷”和“香水瓶”的设计惊叹，仅此而已。

　　苹果手握手机平板电脑智能电视，还有无往不利的 iTunes 和 App Store，微软的 Xbox 4直接把自己定位于“家庭娱乐终端”，手机平板电脑桌面移动三屏一云，听起来就很了不起的样子。Google？它刚刚砸钱买了 Nest，再之前和一众汽车厂商组建了 OAA(Open Automotive Alliance，开放汽车联盟)。

　　在有了互联网、SNS、移动智能设备以及云服务之后，整个世界都变成了有机组合的部分，每个节点都可能是相互连接着的，这使得我们有了更多的玩法和认识。产品与人之间，产品与产品之间，人与人之间，明明是应该被紧密联系在一起的，但是，对不起，除了索尼的 SEN 之外，日本厂商在这方面并没有这方面的计划和动作，他们的产品是以“点”的形式呈现的——一个，一个，再一个，另一个。

　　单纯比拼某个产品的时代已经一去不复返了，由三星掀起的 Android 和苹果之间的硬件升级热战也逐渐恢复平静，拼到最后，大家都已经明白了，在互联网时代，一切没有自己成熟生态体系和平台的互联网公司只有跟在那些巨头后面吃些残羹冷炙的份，最后永远不可能在市场上有自己的一席之地——即便某人真得重制1000个精美绝伦的 icon，它现在也只是个手机 rom 而已，即使这个手机真得能够推出的话，比起已经有了路由器、盒子等一系列产品构成了生态系统雏形的某国内手机厂商来说有什么优势可言？遑论拯救苹果之类的胡话。

　　日本的科技公司用自己整整20年的失落来为我们上了生动的一课，活灵活现地展示了互联网时代的科技公司的生死之道，那么本来就和它们有着不小差距的我们又岂能放过这个赶上甚至超越的大好机会？我们怎么好意思从中吸取不了半点经验教训？我们怎么还能够不警醒自己快形成互联网思维、迎接假如开放互联网世界？

　　留给中国队的时间不多了。

国内骗子太牛了

陌生人发来二维码 女子扫一下损失5000元

陈女士是浙江永康方岩镇人，办了一个小厂，专门做杯子，她还开了个网店。
1月3日下午4点左右，她正在网上和人谈生意。突然，一个陌生人加了她的QQ。
那人给她发了一个二维码，“杯子的型号和样式就在二维码里，你用微信扫一扫就看得
到了，”对方还问她做不做这种杯子。陈女士的生意大多是在网上谈的，她的网店里公
布了淘宝账号和QQ账号，经常有陌生人加她QQ，她以为又是一个来咨询的客户，并没有
特别注意。刚好，儿子正在边上，拿起她的手机，打开微信扫了一下二维码，结果什么
反应也没有。由于两人正准备出去吃饭，陈女士把手机一收，没再留意这事。晚上5点
多，陈女士刚吃完晚饭，手机邮箱突然收到一封邮件。她打开一看，上面提示她的支付
宝数字证书异地登录。她打开电脑一看，交易记录显示，她有两笔帮人代付的交易，一
笔100元，一笔400元。陈女士突然意识到，自己银行卡和支付宝绑定，她马上喊上丈夫
，到银行一查，发现少了5000元。随后，她报了警。永康方岩派出所立即立案侦查。

　　陈女士很疑惑，为什么银行卡转账时，手机没有收到余额变化的短信提醒。
　　而且，用绑定的银行卡付款时，需要输入验证码，她的手机也没收到过验证码。第
二天上午，厂里有人给她发短信，她也没收到。但是，打电话是正常的。　永康市公安
局网监大队民警分析，陈女士手机很可能中了木马病毒。“木马病毒就藏在二维码里，
这种病毒会把手机接收到的短信进行自动转发，并立即删除本机上的信息。”民警说。
对方正是通过这种方式获取验证码等信息。永康方岩派出所的民警说，这种诈骗方式他
们还是第一次遇到。需要提醒的是，现在犯罪分子盯上了二维码，来历不明的二维码千
万不能乱扫。近日，根据派出所提供的立案书面证明，支付宝退还了陈女士被骗的近
5000元钱。陈女士将手机系统重装后，收不到短信的情况也消失了

How to Really Find Start Up Business Ideas

The way to get startup ideas is not to try to think of startup ideas. It's to look for problems, preferably problems you have yourself.

The very best startup ideas tend to have three things in common: they're something the founders themselves want, that they themselves can build, and that few others realize are worth doing. Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo, Google, and Facebook all began this way.

Problems

Why is it so important to work on a problem you have? Among other things, it ensures the problem really exists. It sounds obvious to say you should only work on problems that exist. And yet by far the most common mistake startups make is to solve problems no one has.

I made it myself. In 1995 I started a company to put art galleries online. But galleries didn't want to be online. It's not how the art business works. So why did I spend 6 months working on this stupid idea? Because I didn't pay attention to users. I invented a model of the world that didn't correspond to reality, and worked from that. I didn't notice my model was wrong until I tried to convince users to pay for what we'd built. Even then I took embarrassingly long to catch on. I was attached to my model of the world, and I'd spent a lot of time on the software. They had to want it!

Why do so many founders build things no one wants? Because they begin by trying to think of startup ideas. That m.o. is doubly dangerous: it doesn't merely yield few good ideas; it yields bad ideas that sound plausible enough to fool you into working on them.

At YC we call these "made-up" or "sitcom" startup ideas. Imagine one of the characters on a TV show was starting a startup. The writers would have to invent something for it to do. But coming up with good startup ideas is hard. It's not something you can do for the asking. So (unless they got amazingly lucky) the writers would come up with an idea that sounded plausible, but was actually bad.

For example, a social network for pet owners. It doesn't sound obviously mistaken. Millions of people have pets. Often they care a lot about their pets and spend a lot of money on them. Surely many of these people would like a site where they could talk to other pet owners. Not all of them perhaps, but if just 2 or 3 percent were regular visitors, you could have millions of users. You could serve them targeted offers, and maybe charge for premium features. [1]

The danger of an idea like this is that when you run it by your friends with pets, they don't say "I would never use this." They say "Yeah, maybe I could see using something like that." Even when the startup launches, it will sound plausible to a lot of people. They don't want to use it themselves, at least not right now, but they could imagine other people wanting it. Sum that reaction across the entire population, and you have zero users. [2]

Well

When a startup launches, there have to be at least some users who really need what they're making—not just people who could see themselves using it one day, but who want it urgently. Usually this initial group of users is small, for the simple reason that if there were something that large numbers of people urgently needed and that could be built with the amount of effort a startup usually puts into a version one, it would probably already exist. Which means you have to compromise on one dimension: you can either build something a large number of people want a small amount, or something a small number of people want a large amount. Choose the latter. Not all ideas of that type are good startup ideas, but nearly all good startup ideas are of that type.

Imagine a graph whose x axis represents all the people who might want what you're making and whose y axis represents how much they want it. If you invert the scale on the y axis, you can envision companies as holes. Google is an immense crater: hundreds of millions of people use it, and they need it a lot. A startup just starting out can't expect to excavate that much volume. So you have two choices about the shape of hole you start with. You can either dig a hole that's broad but shallow, or one that's narrow and deep, like a well.

Made-up startup ideas are usually of the first type. Lots of people are mildly interested in a social network for pet owners.

Nearly all good startup ideas are of the second type. Microsoft was a well when they made Altair Basic. There were only a couple thousand Altair owners, but without this software they were programming in machine language. Thirty years later Facebook had the same shape. Their first site was exclusively for Harvard students, of which there are only a few thousand, but those few thousand users wanted it a lot.

When you have an idea for a startup, ask yourself: who wants this right now? Who wants this so much that they'll use it even when it's a crappy version one made by a two-person startup they've never heard of? If you can't answer that, the idea is probably bad.[3]

You don't need the narrowness of the well per se. It's depth you need; you get narrowness as a byproduct of optimizing for depth (and speed). But you almost always do get it. In practice the link between depth and narrowness is so strong that it's a good sign when you know that an idea will appeal strongly to a specific group or type of user.

But while demand shaped like a well is almost a necessary condition for a good startup idea, it's not a sufficient one. If Mark Zuckerberg had built something that could only ever have appealed to Harvard students, it would not have been a good startup idea. Facebook was a good idea because it started with a small market there was a fast path out of. Colleges are similar enough that if you build a facebook that works at Harvard, it will work at any college. So you spread rapidly through all the colleges. Once you have all the college students, you get everyone else simply by letting them in.

Similarly for Microsoft: Basic for the Altair; Basic for other machines; other languages besides Basic; operating systems; applications; IPO.

Self

How do you tell whether there's a path out of an idea? How do you tell whether something is the germ of a giant company, or just a niche product? Often you can't. The founders of Airbnb didn't realize at first how big a market they were tapping. Initially they had a much narrower idea. They were going to let hosts rent out space on their floors during conventions. They didn't foresee the expansion of this idea; it forced itself upon them gradually. All they knew at first is that they were onto something. That's probably as much as Bill Gates or Mark Zuckerberg knew at first.

Occasionally it's obvious from the beginning when there's a path out of the initial niche. And sometimes I can see a path that's not immediately obvious; that's one of our specialties at YC. But there are limits to how well this can be done, no matter how much experience you have. The most important thing to understand about paths out of the initial idea is the meta-fact that these are hard to see.

So if you can't predict whether there's a path out of an idea, how do you choose between ideas? The truth is disappointing but interesting: if you're the right sort of person, you have the right sort of hunches. If you're at the leading edge of a field that's changing fast, when you have a hunch that something is worth doing, you're more likely to be right.

In Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Robert Pirsig says:

You want to know how to paint a perfect painting? It's easy. Make yourself perfect and then just paint naturally.

I've wondered about that passage since I read it in high school. I'm not sure how useful his advice is for painting specifically, but it fits this situation well. Empirically, the way to have good startup ideas is to become the sort of person who has them.

Being at the leading edge of a field doesn't mean you have to be one of the people pushing it forward. You can also be at the leading edge as a user. It was not so much because he was a programmer that Facebook seemed a good idea to Mark Zuckerberg as because he used computers so much. If you'd asked most 40 year olds in 2004 whether they'd like to publish their lives semi-publicly on the Internet, they'd have been horrified at the idea. But Mark already lived online; to him it seemed natural.

Paul Buchheit says that people at the leading edge of a rapidly changing field "live in the future." Combine that with Pirsig and you get:

Live in the future, then build what's missing.

That describes the way many if not most of the biggest startups got started. Neither Apple nor Yahoo nor Google nor Facebook were even supposed to be companies at first. They grew out of things their founders built because there seemed a gap in the world.

If you look at the way successful founders have had their ideas, it's generally the result of some external stimulus hitting a prepared mind. Bill Gates and Paul Allen hear about the Altair and think "I bet we could write a Basic interpreter for it." Drew Houston realizes he's forgotten his USB stick and thinks "I really need to make my files live online." Lots of people heard about the Altair. Lots forgot USB sticks. The reason those stimuli caused those founders to start companies was that their experiences had prepared them to notice the opportunities they represented.

The verb you want to be using with respect to startup ideas is not "think up" but "notice." At YC we call ideas that grow naturally out of the founders' own experiences "organic" startup ideas. The most successful startups almost all begin this way.

That may not have been what you wanted to hear. You may have expected recipes for coming up with startup ideas, and instead I'm telling you that the key is to have a mind that's prepared in the right way. But disappointing though it may be, this is the truth. And it is a recipe of a sort, just one that in the worst case takes a year rather than a weekend.

If you're not at the leading edge of some rapidly changing field, you can get to one. For example, anyone reasonably smart can probably get to an edge of programming (e.g. building mobile apps) in a year. Since a successful startup will consume at least 3-5 years of your life, a year's preparation would be a reasonable investment. Especially if you're also looking for a cofounder. [4]

You don't have to learn programming to be at the leading edge of a domain that's changing fast. Other domains change fast. But while learning to hack is not necessary, it is for the forseeable future sufficient. As Marc Andreessen put it, software is eating the world, and this trend has decades left to run.

Knowing how to hack also means that when you have ideas, you'll be able to implement them. That's not absolutely necessary (Jeff Bezos couldn't) but it's an advantage. It's a big advantage, when you're considering an idea like putting a college facebook online, if instead of merely thinking "That's an interesting idea," you can think instead "That's an interesting idea. I'll try building an initial version tonight." It's even better when you're both a programmer and the target user, because then the cycle of generating new versions and testing them on users can happen inside one head.

Noticing

Once you're living in the future in some respect, the way to notice startup ideas is to look for things that seem to be missing. If you're really at the leading edge of a rapidly changing field, there will be things that are obviously missing. What won't be obvious is that they're startup ideas. So if you want to find startup ideas, don't merely turn on the filter "What's missing?" Also turn off every other filter, particularly "Could this be a big company?" There's plenty of time to apply that test later. But if you're thinking about that initially, it may not only filter out lots of good ideas, but also cause you to focus on bad ones.

Most things that are missing will take some time to see. You almost have to trick yourself into seeing the ideas around you.

But you know the ideas are out there. This is not one of those problems where there might not be an answer. It's impossibly unlikely that this is the exact moment when technological progress stops. You can be sure people are going to build things in the next few years that will make you think "What did I do before x?"

And when these problems get solved, they will probably seem flamingly obvious in retrospect. What you need to do is turn off the filters that usually prevent you from seeing them. The most powerful is simply taking the current state of the world for granted. Even the most radically open-minded of us mostly do that. You couldn't get from your bed to the front door if you stopped to question everything.

But if you're looking for startup ideas you can sacrifice some of the efficiency of taking the status quo for granted and start to question things. Why is your inbox overflowing? Because you get a lot of email, or because it's hard to get email out of your inbox? Why do you get so much email? What problems are people trying to solve by sending you email? Are there better ways to solve them? And why is it hard to get emails out of your inbox? Why do you keep emails around after you've read them? Is an inbox the optimal tool for that?

Pay particular attention to things that chafe you. The advantage of taking the status quo for granted is not just that it makes life (locally) more efficient, but also that it makes life more tolerable. If you knew about all the things we'll get in the next 50 years but don't have yet, you'd find present day life pretty constraining, just as someone from the present would if they were sent back 50 years in a time machine. When something annoys you, it could be because you're living in the future.

When you find the right sort of problem, you should probably be able to describe it as obvious, at least to you. When we started Viaweb, all the online stores were built by hand, by web designers making individual HTML pages. It was obvious to us as programmers that these sites would have to be generated by software. [5]

Which means, strangely enough, that coming up with startup ideas is a question of seeing the obvious. That suggests how weird this process is: you're trying to see things that are obvious, and yet that you hadn't seen.

Since what you need to do here is loosen up your own mind, it may be best not to make too much of a direct frontal attack on the problem—i.e. to sit down and try to think of ideas. The best plan may be just to keep a background process running, looking for things that seem to be missing. Work on hard problems, driven mainly by curiousity, but have a second self watching over your shoulder, taking note of gaps and anomalies. [6]

Give yourself some time. You have a lot of control over the rate at which you turn yours into a prepared mind, but you have less control over the stimuli that spark ideas when they hit it. If Bill Gates and Paul Allen had constrained themselves to come up with a startup idea in one month, what if they'd chosen a month before the Altair appeared? They probably would have worked on a less promising idea. Drew Houston did work on a less promising idea before Dropbox: an SAT prep startup. But Dropbox was a much better idea, both in the absolute sense and also as a match for his skills. [7]

A good way to trick yourself into noticing ideas is to work on projects that seem like they'd be cool. If you do that, you'll naturally tend to build things that are missing. It wouldn't seem as interesting to build something that already existed.

Just as trying to think up startup ideas tends to produce bad ones, working on things that could be dismissed as "toys" often produces good ones. When something is described as a toy, that means it has everything an idea needs except being important. It's cool; users love it; it just doesn't matter. But if you're living in the future and you build something cool that users love, it may matter more than outsiders think. Microcomputers seemed like toys when Apple and Microsoft started working on them. I'm old enough to remember that era; the usual term for people with their own microcomputers was "hobbyists." BackRub seemed like an inconsequential science project. The Facebook was just a way for undergrads to stalk one another.

At YC we're excited when we meet startups working on things that we could imagine know-it-alls on forums dismissing as toys. To us that's positive evidence an idea is good.

If you can afford to take a long view (and arguably you can't afford not to), you can turn "Live in the future and build what's missing" into something even better:

Live in the future and build what seems interesting.

School

That's what I'd advise college students to do, rather than trying to learn about "entrepreneurship." "Entrepreneurship" is something you learn best by doing it. The examples of the most successful founders make that clear. What you should be spending your time on in college is ratcheting yourself into the future. College is an incomparable opportunity to do that. What a waste to sacrifice an opportunity to solve the hard part of starting a startup—becoming the sort of person who can have organic startup ideas—by spending time learning about the easy part. Especially since you won't even really learn about it, any more than you'd learn about sex in a class. All you'll learn is the words for things.

The clash of domains is a particularly fruitful source of ideas. If you know a lot about programming and you start learning about some other field, you'll probably see problems that software could solve. In fact, you're doubly likely to find good problems in another domain: (a) the inhabitants of that domain are not as likely as software people to have already solved their problems with software, and (b) since you come into the new domain totally ignorant, you don't even know what the status quo is to take it for granted.

So if you're a CS major and you want to start a startup, instead of taking a class on entrepreneurship you're better off taking a class on, say, genetics. Or better still, go work for a biotech company. CS majors normally get summer jobs at computer hardware or software companies. But if you want to find startup ideas, you might do better to get a summer job in some unrelated field. [8]

Or don't take any extra classes, and just build things. It's no coincidence that Microsoft and Facebook both got started in January. At Harvard that is (or was) Reading Period, when students have no classes to attend because they're supposed to be studying for finals. [9]

But don't feel like you have to build things that will become startups. That's premature optimization. Just build things. Preferably with other students. It's not just the classes that make a university such a good place to crank oneself into the future. You're also surrounded by other people trying to do the same thing. If you work together with them on projects, you'll end up producing not just organic ideas, but organic ideas with organic founding teams—and that, empirically, is the best combination.

Beware of research. If an undergrad writes something all his friends start using, it's quite likely to represent a good startup idea. Whereas a PhD dissertation is extremely unlikely to. For some reason, the more a project has to count as research, the less likely it is to be something that could be turned into a startup. [10] I think the reason is that the subset of ideas that count as research is so narrow that it's unlikely that a project that satisfied that constraint would also satisfy the orthogonal constraint of solving users' problems. Whereas when students (or professors) build something as a side-project, they automatically gravitate toward solving users' problems—perhaps even with an additional energy that comes from being freed from the constraints of research.

Competition

Because a good idea should seem obvious, when you have one you'll tend to feel that you're late. Don't let that deter you. Worrying that you're late is one of the signs of a good idea. Ten minutes of searching the web will usually settle the question. Even if you find someone else working on the same thing, you're probably not too late. It's exceptionally rare for startups to be killed by competitors—so rare that you can almost discount the possibility. So unless you discover a competitor with the sort of lock-in that would prevent users from choosing you, don't discard the idea.

If you're uncertain, ask users. The question of whether you're too late is subsumed by the question of whether anyone urgently needs what you plan to make. If you have something that no competitor does and that some subset of users urgently need, you have a beachhead. [11]

The question then is whether that beachhead is big enough. Or more importantly, who's in it: if the beachhead consists of people doing something lots more people will be doing in the future, then it's probably big enough no matter how small it is. For example, if you're building something differentiated from competitors by the fact that it works on phones, but it only works on the newest phones, that's probably a big enough beachhead.

Err on the side of doing things where you'll face competitors. Inexperienced founders usually give competitors more credit than they deserve. Whether you succeed depends far more on you than on your competitors. So better a good idea with competitors than a bad one without.

You don't need to worry about entering a "crowded market" so long as you have a thesis about what everyone else in it is overlooking. In fact that's a very promising starting point. Google was that type of idea. Your thesis has to be more precise than "we're going to make an x that doesn't suck" though. You have to be able to phrase it in terms of something the incumbents are overlooking. Best of all is when you can say that they didn't have the courage of their convictions, and that your plan is what they'd have done if they'd followed through on their own insights. Google was that type of idea too. The search engines that preceded them shied away from the most radical implications of what they were doing—particularly that the better a job they did, the faster users would leave.

A crowded market is actually a good sign, because it means both that there's demand and that none of the existing solutions are good enough. A startup can't hope to enter a market that's obviously big and yet in which they have no competitors. So any startup that succeeds is either going to be entering a market with existing competitors, but armed with some secret weapon that will get them all the users (like Google), or entering a market that looks small but which will turn out to be big (like Microsoft). [12]

Filters

There are two more filters you'll need to turn off if you want to notice startup ideas: the unsexy filter and the schlep filter.

Most programmers wish they could start a startup by just writing some brilliant code, pushing it to a server, and having users pay them lots of money. They'd prefer not to deal with tedious problems or get involved in messy ways with the real world. Which is a reasonable preference, because such things slow you down. But this preference is so widespread that the space of convenient startup ideas has been stripped pretty clean. If you let your mind wander a few blocks down the street to the messy, tedious ideas, you'll find valuable ones just sitting there waiting to be implemented.

The schlep filter is so dangerous that I wrote a separate essay about the condition it induces, which I called schlep blindness. I gave Stripe as an example of a startup that benefited from turning off this filter, and a pretty striking example it is. Thousands of programmers were in a position to see this idea; thousands of programmers knew how painful it was to process payments before Stripe. But when they looked for startup ideas they didn't see this one, because unconsciously they shrank from having to deal with payments. And dealing with payments is a schlep for Stripe, but not an intolerable one. In fact they might have had net less pain; because the fear of dealing with payments kept most people away from this idea, Stripe has had comparatively smooth sailing in other areas that are sometimes painful, like user acquisition. They didn't have to try very hard to make themselves heard by users, because users were desperately waiting for what they were building.

The unsexy filter is similar to the schlep filter, except it keeps you from working on problems you despise rather than ones you fear. We overcame this one to work on Viaweb. There were interesting things about the architecture of our software, but we weren't interested in ecommerce per se. We could see the problem was one that needed to be solved though.

Turning off the schlep filter is more important than turning off the unsexy filter, because the schlep filter is more likely to be an illusion. And even to the degree it isn't, it's a worse form of self-indulgence. Starting a successful startup is going to be fairly laborious no matter what. Even if the product doesn't entail a lot of schleps, you'll still have plenty dealing with investors, hiring and firing people, and so on. So if there's some idea you think would be cool but you're kept away from by fear of the schleps involved, don't worry: any sufficiently good idea will have as many.

The unsexy filter, while still a source of error, is not as entirely useless as the schlep filter. If you're at the leading edge of a field that's changing rapidly, your ideas about what's sexy will be somewhat correlated with what's valuable in practice. Particularly as you get older and more experienced. Plus if you find an idea sexy, you'll work on it more enthusiastically. [13]

Recipes

While the best way to discover startup ideas is to become the sort of person who has them and then build whatever interests you, sometimes you don't have that luxury. Sometimes you need an idea now. For example, if you're working on a startup and your initial idea turns out to be bad.

For the rest of this essay I'll talk about tricks for coming up with startup ideas on demand. Although empirically you're better off using the organic strategy, you could succeed this way. You just have to be more disciplined. When you use the organic method, you don't even notice an idea unless it's evidence that something is truly missing. But when you make a conscious effort to think of startup ideas, you have to replace this natural constraint with self-discipline. You'll see a lot more ideas, most of them bad, so you need to be able to filter them.

One of the biggest dangers of not using the organic method is the example of the organic method. Organic ideas feel like inspirations. There are a lot of stories about successful startups that began when the founders had what seemed a crazy idea but "just knew" it was promising. When you feel that about an idea you've had while trying to come up with startup ideas, you're probably mistaken.

When searching for ideas, look in areas where you have some expertise. If you're a database expert, don't build a chat app for teenagers (unless you're also a teenager). Maybe it's a good idea, but you can't trust your judgment about that, so ignore it. There have to be other ideas that involve databases, and whose quality you can judge. Do you find it hard to come up with good ideas involving databases? That's because your expertise raises your standards. Your ideas about chat apps are just as bad, but you're giving yourself a Dunning-Kruger pass in that domain.

The place to start looking for ideas is things you need. There mustbe things you need. [14]

One good trick is to ask yourself whether in your previous job you ever found yourself saying "Why doesn't someone make x? If someone made x we'd buy it in a second." If you can think of any x people said that about, you probably have an idea. You know there's demand, and people don't say that about things that are impossible to build.

More generally, try asking yourself whether there's something unusual about you that makes your needs different from most other people's. You're probably not the only one. It's especially good if you're different in a way people will increasingly be.

If you're changing ideas, one unusual thing about you is the idea you'd previously been working on. Did you discover any needs while working on it? Several well-known startups began this way. Hotmail began as something its founders wrote to talk about their previous startup idea while they were working at their day jobs. [15]

A particularly promising way to be unusual is to be young. Some of the most valuable new ideas take root first among people in their teens and early twenties. And while young founders are at a disadvantage in some respects, they're the only ones who really understand their peers. It would have been very hard for someone who wasn't a college student to start Facebook. So if you're a young founder (under 23 say), are there things you and your friends would like to do that current technology won't let you?

The next best thing to an unmet need of your own is an unmet need of someone else. Try talking to everyone you can about the gaps they find in the world. What's missing? What would they like to do that they can't? What's tedious or annoying, particularly in their work? Let the conversation get general; don't be trying too hard to find startup ideas. You're just looking for something to spark a thought. Maybe you'll notice a problem they didn't consciously realize they had, because you know how to solve it.

When you find an unmet need that isn't your own, it may be somewhat blurry at first. The person who needs something may not know exactly what they need. In that case I often recommend that founders act like consultants—that they do what they'd do if they'd been retained to solve the problems of this one user. People's problems are similar enough that nearly all the code you write this way will be reusable, and whatever isn't will be a small price to start out certain that you've reached the bottom of the well. [16]

One way to ensure you do a good job solving other people's problems is to make them your own. When Rajat Suri of E la Carte decided to write software for restaurants, he got a job as a waiter to learn how restaurants worked. That may seem like taking things to extremes, but startups are extreme. We love it when founders do such things.

In fact, one strategy I recommend to people who need a new idea is not merely to turn off their schlep and unsexy filters, but to seek out ideas that are unsexy or involve schleps. Don't try to start Twitter. Those ideas are so rare that you can't find them by looking for them. Make something unsexy that people will pay you for.

A good trick for bypassing the schlep and to some extent the unsexy filter is to ask what you wish someone else would build, so that you could use it. What would you pay for right now?

Since startups often garbage-collect broken companies and industries, it can be a good trick to look for those that are dying, or deserve to, and try to imagine what kind of company would profit from their demise. For example, journalism is in free fall at the moment. But there may still be money to be made from something like journalism. What sort of company might cause people in the future to say "this replaced journalism" on some axis?

But imagine asking that in the future, not now. When one company or industry replaces another, it usually comes in from the side. So don't look for a replacement for x; look for something that people will later say turned out to be a replacement for x. And be imaginative about the axis along which the replacement occurs. Traditional journalism, for example, is a way for readers to get information and to kill time, a way for writers to make money and to get attention, and a vehicle for several different types of advertising. It could be replaced on any of these axes (it has already started to be on most).

When startups consume incumbents, they usually start by serving some small but important market that the big players ignore. It's particularly good if there's an admixture of disdain in the big players' attitude, because that often misleads them. For example, after Steve Wozniak built the computer that became the Apple I, he felt obliged to give his then-employer Hewlett-Packard the option to produce it. Fortunately for him, they turned it down, and one of the reasons they did was that it used a TV for a monitor, which seemed intolerably déclassé to a high-end hardware company like HP was at the time. [17]

Are there groups of scruffy but sophisticated users like the early microcomputer "hobbyists" that are currently being ignored by the big players? A startup with its sights set on bigger things can often capture a small market easily by expending an effort that wouldn't be justified by that market alone.

Similarly, since the most successful startups generally ride some wave bigger than themselves, it could be a good trick to look for waves and ask how one could benefit from them. The prices of gene sequencing and 3D printing are both experiencing Moore's Law-like declines. What new things will we be able to do in the new world we'll have in a few years? What are we unconsciously ruling out as impossible that will soon be possible?

Organic

But talking about looking explicitly for waves makes it clear that such recipes are plan B for getting startup ideas. Looking for waves is essentially a way to simulate the organic method. If you're at the leading edge of some rapidly changing field, you don't have to look for waves; you are the wave.

Finding startup ideas is a subtle business, and that's why most people who try fail so miserably. It doesn't work well simply to try to think of startup ideas. If you do that, you get bad ones that sound dangerously plausible. The best approach is more indirect: if you have the right sort of background, good startup ideas will seem obvious to you. But even then, not immediately. It takes time to come across situations where you notice something missing. And often these gaps won't seem to be ideas for companies, just things that would be interesting to build. Which is why it's good to have the time and the inclination to build things just because they're interesting.

Live in the future and build what seems interesting. Strange as it sounds, that's the real recipe.







Notes

[1] This form of bad idea has been around as long as the web. It was common in the 1990s, except then people who had it used to say they were going to create a portal for x instead of a social network for x. Structurally the idea is stone soup: you post a sign saying "this is the place for people interested in x," and all those people show up and you make money from them. What lures founders into this sort of idea are statistics about the millions of people who might be interested in each type of x. What they forget is that any given person might have 20 affinities by this standard, and no one is going to visit 20 different communities regularly.

[2] I'm not saying, incidentally, that I know for sure a social network for pet owners is a bad idea. I know it's a bad idea the way I know randomly generated DNA would not produce a viable organism. The set of plausible sounding startup ideas is many times larger than the set of good ones, and many of the good ones don't even sound that plausible. So if all you know about a startup idea is that it sounds plausible, you have to assume it's bad.

[3] More precisely, the users' need has to give them sufficient activation energy to start using whatever you make, which can vary a lot. For example, the activation energy for enterprise software sold through traditional channels is very high, so you'd have to be a lot better to get users to switch. Whereas the activation energy required to switch to a new search engine is low. Which in turn is why search engines are so much better than enterprise software.

[4] This gets harder as you get older. While the space of ideas doesn't have dangerous local maxima, the space of careers does. There are fairly high walls between most of the paths people take through life, and the older you get, the higher the walls become.

[5] It was also obvious to us that the web was going to be a big deal. Few non-programmers grasped that in 1995, but the programmers had seen what GUIs had done for desktop computers.

[6] Maybe it would work to have this second self keep a journal, and each night to make a brief entry listing the gaps and anomalies you'd noticed that day. Not startup ideas, just the raw gaps and anomalies.

[7] Sam Altman points out that taking time to come up with an idea is not merely a better strategy in an absolute sense, but also like an undervalued stock in that so few founders do it.

There's comparatively little competition for the best ideas, because few founders are willing to put in the time required to notice them. Whereas there is a great deal of competition for mediocre ideas, because when people make up startup ideas, they tend to make up the same ones.

[8] For the computer hardware and software companies, summer jobs are the first phase of the recruiting funnel. But if you're good you can skip the first phase. If you're good you'll have no trouble getting hired by these companies when you graduate, regardless of how you spent your summers.

[9] The empirical evidence suggests that if colleges want to help their students start startups, the best thing they can do is leave them alone in the right way.

[10] I'm speaking here of IT startups; in biotech things are different.

[11] This is an instance of a more general rule: focus on users, not competitors. The most important information about competitors is what you learn via users anyway.

[12] In practice most successful startups have elements of both. And you can describe each strategy in terms of the other by adjusting the boundaries of what you call the market. But it's useful to consider these two ideas separately.

[13] I almost hesitate to raise that point though. Startups are businesses; the point of a business is to make money; and with that additional constraint, you can't expect you'll be able to spend all your time working on what interests you most.

[14] The need has to be a strong one. You can retroactively describe any made-up idea as something you need. But do you really need that recipe site or local event aggregator as much as Drew Houston needed Dropbox, or Brian Chesky and Joe Gebbia needed Airbnb?

Quite often at YC I find myself asking founders "Would you use this thing yourself, if you hadn't written it?" and you'd be surprised how often the answer is no.

[15] Paul Buchheit points out that trying to sell something bad can be a source of better ideas:

"The best technique I've found for dealing with YC companies that have bad ideas is to tell them to go sell the product ASAP (before wasting time building it). Not only do they learn that nobody wants what they are building, they very often come back with a real idea that they discovered in the process of trying to sell the bad idea."

[16] Here's a recipe that might produce the next Facebook, if you're college students. If you have a connection to one of the more powerful sororities at your school, approach the queen bees thereof and offer to be their personal IT consultants, building anything they could imagine needing in their social lives that didn't already exist. Anything that got built this way would be very promising, because such users are not just the most demanding but also the perfect point to spread from.

I have no idea whether this would work.

[17] And the reason it used a TV for a monitor is that Steve Wozniak started out by solving his own problems. He, like most of his peers, couldn't afford a monitor.

美国的退休金制度简介

在美国，退休后其退休金(不包括低收入福利金)的来源主要是由4个方面: 1. 社会安全保险金(Social Security)， 适用于所有在美国合法工作10年以上的美国人与外国人(绿卡持有人)。 2. 由公司提供的延迟报税的个人退休储蓄计划， 例如401K， 457等，只适用于在公司有提供该福利打工的个人。 3. 公司的养老金计划(目前只有美国的政府雇员还有此计划，私人公司经2008年的金融风暴现都已不复存在了)。主要适用于美国的公务员。 4. 政府提供给个人的退休储蓄计划。共分二种: 一是延迟报税的个人傳統退休储计划(IRA)。二是税后存入的个人退休储蓄计划(Roth IRA)等等。适用于所有能在美国合法工作的美国人与外国人(绿卡持有人)。 下面就把以上的四种退休金简单的解释一下: 1. 社会安全保险金(Social Security)， 发源与1935年以应对美国1930年代的经济萧条。每人都将工资的一部分放入该保险基金， 2014年所有年收入低于11万7千美金，都得放工资的6.2%入社会安全保险金。工资超过的部分就不用放钱了。如收入5万的，每年放入3千1百。年薪15万也只能放入7254美元(11万7千乘以0.062)。其作用是当失业时， 部分失业金额就来自与该基金。另外就是当年满67岁，在美做工十年或更多， 就可以拿此钱， 作为生活的补助。如果年满70岁再拿。钱会更多。 因为政府鼓励人们做工做得越久越好。但对于高收入的中产阶级，这点收入根本就不够用。因为此钱最多也只能拿到你退休时工资的25%(因为计算很复杂， 只是给个大概的数字)。例如退休时年工资5万， 67岁退休时最多也就拿1万3左右。年薪15万的，退休工资最多也就拿11万7千乘以0.25，即3万美元左右 (即与年薪11万7千的一样多)。所以要想退休能够过好日子还得靠以下的几个金钱来源。 2. 由公司给的个人延迟报税的个人退休储蓄计划: 例如401K， 457等。2014年每人最多可放入1万7千5百元。年满50岁的还可以多放入5千5百元。这有二个优点: 一是如果年收入5万， 那今年联邦的税只要报32500元而不是5万元。二是利用这个户口你可以买卖股票，所赚的钱不用报税。缺点是，这笔钱一般只能在你的年龄达到59岁半以后才能拿。而且如果那时你的收入还是很高，或者那时联邦政府提高了税率。 你交的本金税可能比现在还高。 3. 公司的养老金计划: 这主要是政府公务员的退休金。例如纽约政府雇员的养老金以1990年后招入的为例(因为不同年代招的，福利不一样， 越早工作的福利越好): 如果你做满30年，年龄达到55岁， 或你年龄达到60岁并做满十年， 那每做满一年， 养老金就算你工资的2%。如做满30年， 就能拿你退休前5年中3年最高平均工资的60%，再加上退休那年5星期的带薪假期，那就相当于最后3年最高平均工资的70%。因为退休后不用交州税， 医疗保险以及失业金保险等。 你实际到手的钱， 与上班时拿到手的钱几乎一样。 特别是很多有工会的警察， 消防员， 教师等， 因为他们是拿时薪的。所以他们都会在退休前的最后3年做很多的超时工， 这样他们退休时的工资往往就要比平时的工资多很多。多二， 三倍人工的都会有。所以这些人中退休工资能拿6位数字的都不足为奇。而当他们满67岁时又可从社会保险金中再拿些钱。所以美国的公务员，平时工资不一定高，像纽约州长， 去年的年薪才17万左右(美国总统的年薪也才40万左右)， 但退休金是全美国人中最好的。 4. 作为普通的公司雇员就要自己存由政府提供的个人退休储蓄计划: 一是延迟报税的个人传统退休储蓄计划 (IRA)。 二是报好税后再存入的个人退休储蓄计划(ROTH IRA)。 2014年传统IRA，夫妇年收入在9万5千以下的每年能存5千5百元，满50岁的能存6千5百。但如夫妇年收入在11万5千元以上的就不能存了。其规则类似与上面提及的公司401K， 与457计划。 2014年的ROTH IRA也就是说是在报好税后再存入的个人退休储蓄计划。 好处就在于59岁半拿钱出来时， 无论是本金还是投资所挣的钱都不用再交税。但其开户条件存入多少钱， 也要根据其家庭收入情况而定。如果夫妇收入在18万1千以下的，每年可存入5千5百元， 满50岁的能存6千5百。但如夫妇年收入在19万1千以上的就不可以存任何钱了。还有SEP，SIMPLE等的IRA都大同小异了。 在美国， 如果2014年家庭收入超过19万1千以上的家庭。 退休后除了社会安全金可以拿(3万左右一年)， 其它的都得在自己退休前做准备了。所以在美国，退休计划只为中产阶级服务，不包括年收入20万以上的富人。

China 房地产将有巨变

房地产将有巨变

李稻葵

2013-11-12 7:58:00

国庆节期间，我参加大学同学毕业20年聚会。期间也无法回避房价走势这个老生常谈的问题。因为我们大学的专业正好是工业与民用建筑，班上很多同学都是从事建筑行业的：有搞房地产开发的、有开设计院的、有开监理公司的、有搞设计的、有当监理的、有搞建筑预算的、最多的是在房地产公司和建筑公司当技术老总的，所以大家在一起难免会谈到房地产的相关看法。


总体来说，我感觉大家对未来房地产走势都比较乐观。多名同学表示还想继续购买房子对资产保值和增值。有位开发商的同学，一个楼盘刚刚全部卖完，又拍买了2块土地准备大干一场。另一个同学的朋友刚刚拍得一块土地，到处找资金开发。我当年大学寝室的老大多次问我对房价走势的判断，由于这个问题比较复杂，加上当时时间也比较匆忙，我答应老大回家以后尽快写一篇文章来回答他这个问题。


要分析中国房价的变化，必须深入分析当今中国房屋的供应和需求。并找到中国房屋的供求关系从量变到质变的大概时间点。为什么我认为中国房地产仅仅是最后的疯狂呢？因为中国房地产发生了很多实质性的变化：


1、新一届政府上台，进一步提高第二套住房贷款的首付款比例和贷款利率，并对出售自有住房按转让所得20%计征个税。这样的政策会导致市场房屋购买能力的下降，同时导致投机成本增加。实际是从根本上减弱了市场购买力；


2、中央货币政策已经从过度宽松，开始转变为既不宽松也不紧缩的中性政策。宣告中国过度宽松的货币政策已经结束。银行现在极度缺钱，不仅二套房贷利率不能优惠，首套房的利率也大幅提高。银行对房贷的贷款比国家政策还严格。说明银行资金确实很紧张了；


3、外资彻底撤出中国金融市场，导致中国人民币基础货币相对减少。加上先知先觉的国内外投资者已经开始抛售中国房屋资产，这些行为会导致中国外汇相对减少，同样能导致基础货币减少。也能导致银行存款相对减少。这些会导致银行贷款能力相对下滑；


4、李嘉诚等有国际影响力的人物开始抛售中国房地产资产，会影响很多精明投资者对市场预期的判断，带动部分精明者加速抛售中国房地产；


5、2013年新房和二手房成交量同步大幅上涨，说明大量的刚需已经接盘。大量的刚需在漫长的等待中，最后屈服大量入市抢购房屋。大量刚需高位接盘，意味将来接盘的力量越来越弱了；


6、保障性住房继续修建，中央政府为了解决低收入者的住房问题，不得不大量修建保障性住房。这些保障房加速了房屋的供应；


7、房价快速上涨，导致部分人彻底失去购买能力。导致市场有效需求减少；


8、鄂尔多斯和温州房价暴跌的前车之鉴，让部分先知先觉的投机者感受到危机靠近。同时，温州和鄂尔多斯房价大跌已经让当地银行坏账大量增加，银行业已经意识到房价下跌的风险，开始偷
偷紧缩房地产贷款，所以各地银行对房贷审核越来越严，房贷利息远远高于国家的底线；


9、由于开发商房屋销售很理想，2013年土地拍卖明显增加，地王不断出现。开发商乐观情绪明显升温。由于他们看好后市房价，必定会加快建设进度，1年左右市场供应肯定会明显增加；


10、中国人在国外大量购房，成为英国、美国、加拿大、澳大利亚等国的房屋购买主力军。很多国家甚至出台购房移民政策吸引中国人去他们国家买房。如果中国房价再继续上涨，中国更多的人会在国外购买房屋；由于中国房价过度上涨，大量的中国人转而抛售中国房屋，购买国外房地产，实际也等于在增加国内市场的供应。并导致大量财富转移国外。等于中国人去接盘其他国家的过剩房地产，化解发达国家的经济危机。但将来我们的过剩房地产谁来化解呢？我在1年以前的文章中就分析了，中国房价上涨必将导致中国人大量在外国购买房产。之所以大量去发达国家买房，原因很简单。因为外国很多国家房屋性价比已经远远超过中国了。比如：100万在美国能买到的房子，在中国可能还买不到。一个中等发展中国家的房价超过了发达国家本身就是一个笑话。


11、中国存在大量的空置房，最最保守估计超过5000万套。中国已建加上在建房屋和土地储备已经严重过剩。国家统计局数据显示：2012年，商品房销售面积111304万平方米，比上年增长1.8%，其中，住宅销售面积增长2%，商品房销售额64456亿元，增长10%。

其中，住宅销售额增长10.9%。2012年，房地产开发企业房屋施工面积573418万平方米，比上年增长13.2%，住宅施工面积428964万平方米，增长10.6%，住宅新开工面积130695万平方米，下降11.2%，住宅竣工面积79043万平方米，增长6.4%。按最保守的计算法，按开发商平均储备3年可开发的土地面积计算，房地产开发企业囤积储备住宅面积至少40亿平方米以上。加上地方政府储备的土地。总计土地储备面积当然更大。按现在的开发速度，至少可供3—5年房地产开发。


以上数据分析可以进一步得出下列结论：按人均30平米计算，住宅在建面积42.9亿平方米大概能解决1.4亿人的住房问题，加上空置的5000套房子大概解决1.6亿人的住房。意思是在建和空置的住房就至少能解决3亿人的住房问题。开发商囤积的40亿平方米住宅可开发面积可解决至少1.2亿人的住房问题。再加上地方政府储备的土地随便能解决几千万人的住房问题。解决2亿人的住房问题应该问题不大。意思是按房地产现在的开发速度，5年内能解决5亿人的住房问题。即使按较高的空置率计算，中国也至少能解决4亿人的住房问题。


数据显示，中国房屋自有率已经达到80%，在世界已经是很高水平，远远超过发达国家60—70%的自主率。


根据2012年5月发布的《中国居住小康指数》报告，将近8成的受访者已经拥有自己的住房。；而之前发布的一份报告说，目前中国自有住房拥有率高达89.68%，远远超过美国、英国、日本(美国为65%，英国为70%，日本为60%)。


中国仅仅只有20%的人没有买房。按中国城市人口7亿计算，当前没有房屋的城市人口仅仅1.4亿，即使中国住房率达到100%（当然这是不可能的，除非共产主义最高阶段实现了）。在建房屋加上空置房，中国房屋最少还过剩1.6亿人的住房。即使按国际空置率警戒线15%计算，中国现有7亿城市人口的15%，最高能容忍的空置房也只有 1亿人，即使不再新建一套住宅，我们还过剩0.6亿人的住房。我们也能解决今后6年的房屋需求（按每年1000万人城市化的进度计算）。加上土地储备我们还能解决2亿人的住房问题。即使计算空置率，至少需要20年以上才能消化掉这些土地储备。即便如此，地方政府居然还幻想将来通过出售土地来偿还高到20万亿的地方债务！还想通过出售土地来维持城镇化投资建设！


以上分析可以看出，中国房屋过剩已经非常严重了。中国房地产泡沫已经到骇人听闻的地步了。


一年前，我曾经写过一篇文章：「中国房价为何如此坚挺」，详细说明了中国房价高涨的原因。在房屋总体过剩的情况下，中国房价之所以还能疯狂的上涨，主要是投机和投资者囤积大量房源，开发商和地方政府大量囤积土地，大量在建房还未入市。加上房价10年持续上涨导致许多人恐慌性买房所致。银行资金紧张、刚需大量恐慌性买房、大量高端投资者海外购房、投机成本增加、房价大幅上涨等因素已经让潜在客户大量减少。意思是需求在大量减少。


由于新国五条没有太大新意，加上二手房税收政策导致大家更愿意购买新房，大量的刚需集中入市，加上新建住房短期内无法满足市场需求，出现供不应求局面，导致最近 1年房屋快速上涨。而房价上涨又加剧市场恐慌，更多的刚需加入买房队伍。但房价的快速上涨不仅消耗掉了大量刚需，而且还导致部分人彻底失去购买能力。最终导致需求快速减少。而供应却源源不断，因为在建住宅很快就会源源不断的成为新的供应。地方政府因为财政对土地的依赖性，必将继续源源不断的出售土地。加上房价快速上涨导致很多高端投资者加速抛售中国房
产去国外购买房屋，等于增加了国内市场的房屋供应。


房地产市场中影响最大的因素，还是大量囤积房源的投资者和投机者们，一旦他们对房屋上涨预期发生改变，只要他们预期房价会下跌，大量囤积瞬间就会变成铺天盖地的抛售，瞬间增加市场的供应。让房屋市场快速从“天堂”坠入“地狱”。因为中国房屋囤积的数量非常庞大，所以这部分囤积者行为一旦发生改变，将很快改变房地产市场的供求关系。对房价起非常大的作用，短期作用甚至远远超过新建房屋的影响。


不管是从未来的供求关系变化，还是中国房价国际性价比看。中国房价已经是强弩之末。由于短期房价上涨预期很强，囤积者现在还惜售，新建房屋入市时间,房价短期还可能会继续上涨。但这种上涨只是最后的疯狂。


很多人担心，一旦房价出现下跌，政府如果再次大规模放松货币怎么办呢？这个担心完全没有必要，因为中国房价持续的上涨，已经让中国全球制造业竞争力大幅下滑（原因我以前文章多次论述，这里不再重复），房价上涨已经导致中国每年几百亿美元资金外流购房，加上外资金融机构彻底撤出中国，以李嘉诚为代表的国内资本外撤加速。


房价上涨不仅伤害了中国的国际竞争力，也导致资本大量外流。这种情况下如果再大规模发行货币推高房价，人民币必将面临大幅贬值。而人民币贬值以前，资本会大量集中外逃，中国财富就会损失殆尽。其后果比房价下跌还严重，房价下跌，肉烂在锅里，房价再上涨等于把钱送给别人，坏账留给自己。当然如果真的要大规模印发钞票，我也无话可说，但我相信中国精英们不会这么疯狂的孤注一掷。因为即使孤注一掷，也最多是苟延残喘，最后结局会更悲惨。


世界上根本没有永远上涨的东西，如果有，那么都可以通过持有该物品，让财富永远不停的增长。这些人的子子孙孙再也不用工作了。


地方政府用尽一切资源维护和推高房价，在这种情况下一旦出现房价下跌。说明政府再也没有任何力量能继续维护房价上涨了，这时候房价必将一泻千里。鄂尔多斯和温州房价就是这样的模式。特别是在经历一段快速上涨以后，需求快速减少（大量刚需集中购买房屋和部分购房者失去购房能力），供应不断增加（开发商加速建设和政府加速拍卖土地），最后供求关系转择点出现。而房价一旦出现下跌预期，大量囤积者也加入抛售房屋的队伍中，加剧房屋下跌速度。温州和鄂尔多斯就是因为房价快速上涨，导致房价最后崩盘。


中国对房地产市场的处理方法如同垒砌堰塞湖，为了防止堰塞湖的水流下来，用尽一切资源建设堤坝，结果堤坝越来越高，当然堰塞湖内的水位也越来越高。终于有一天，当资源耗尽，再也没有任何力量加固堤坝的时候，而堰塞湖的水位却不断上涨。这时候崩溃就无法避免，高高垒砌崩溃必将导致洪水滔天、尸横遍野。


上帝要其死亡，必先让其疯狂。房价这种疯狂，已经在为自己挖掘坟墓。现在的房价如同6000点的股市，虽然看起来很疯狂，但距离万丈深渊已经不远了。股市6000点的时候，市场疯狂的叫嚷要去10000点，结果万点却成为了梦想，1600点却实现了。


从在建房屋速度、社会资金供求、国际资本撤离速度、房价上涨幅度看，中国的房价最多能再坚持一年左右，就会开始土崩瓦解。一场浩劫无法避免。


解决过剩产能或产品只有一个办法，就是降价。这就是美国为什么在危机发生以后，不愿意
刺激经济的原因。因为刺激经济会导致价格高企，而价格高企会导致生产供应增加，根本不可能解决过剩产能和产品问题，而过剩产品和产能不解决，经济就不可能持续正常发展。所以美国宁愿大量发放失业救济金，长达5年的时间保持经济低迷，也不愿意简单的刺激经济。当然，美国能度过这次危机，全世界其他国家的鼎力相助（大规模刺激自己的内需）功不可没。


中国人经历了股市和黄金的疯狂，当时所有的人都认为股市和黄金是不可能下跌的。如今这些不可破灭的神话早已破灭。人们不仅没有吸取其中的教训，居然固执的再次认为房价是永远上涨的，即使全世界很多国家的房价泡沫已经破灭，即使鄂尔多斯和温州房价已经暴跌，即使李嘉诚开始大量抛售中国房地产，即使外资银行已经全部抛售完中国银行的股票，即使中国房屋空置率已经高的吓人，即使中国7个城市被评为世界最高房价。他们依然坚定的认为中国房价不可能下跌。等待他们的必将是比股市和黄金更疯狂的结局。人们会为自己的疯狂付出代价。


违背经济规律者，最后一定会受到经济规律的惩罚。那些叫嚷着逆经济周期者，根本不懂经济规律，只是无知无畏罢了。


中国现在过剩产能世界第一，几乎个个行业都出现骇人听闻的过剩产能。但我们的办法依然是刺激需求。我们的刺激政策，最后不仅不能化解任何问题，反而会制造更大的过剩、更多的债务和坏账，最后我们只能迎来漫长和痛苦的经济衰退。种瓜得瓜种豆得豆，我们自己种下的苦果只能自己吞下。

银行电汇到我local的银行

如果是汇9000美刀的话, 用西联汇款在光大的那个业务 (西联一笔9000是上限), 只要30美元手续
费 (所有的费用, 西联汇款没有什么中间费啥的等坑爹的玩意), 这个总费用其实很低了 (相比电汇的各种什么电报费手续费中间费到账费的总和而言).